UK - Concerns Grow Over Russian Ships Near British Waters And Wider Hybrid Warfare

The Royal Navy shadows three Russian ships through the Strait of Dover and the English Channel

Intelligence Update:

• On 19 March 2025, the Royal Navy reportedly tracked three suspicious Russian “spy ships” in the English Channel. According to the Royal Navy, Type 23 frigate HMS Somerset and minehunter HMS Cattistock, along with RFA Tidesurge and Navy helicopters, monitored and reported every move of the four Russian vessels as they passed through the English Channel and the North Sea.

  
  

• The Russian ships, which included destroyer RFN Severomorsk, landing ship RFN Alexander Shabalin, and two transport ships, MV Sparta IV and MV Siyanie Severa, were sailing east towards the Baltic Sea. This comes after the Royal Navy began an operation on 16 March 2025 after tanker Tidesurge had monitored the destroyer in the North Sea and through the Strait of Dover. HMS Somerset and her Merlin helicopter from 814 Naval Air Squadron then began shadowing the Russian task group's escort, Severomorsk, south of Portsmouth, and the RAF deployed a P8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft from RAF Lossiemouth, collecting vital information as the Russians made their journey.

  
  

• Reports further indicate that the Udaloy-class Severomorsk then met the cargo and landing ships in the western reaches of the Channel, off Cornwall, where minehunter HMS Cattistock was already monitoring the Russian group.

  As the Russian ships sailed back east through the Channel and the North Sea towards the Baltic Sea, the Royal Navy ships deployed powerful sensors and launched the Merlin and Wildcat helicopters to report on every move.

Recent Sightings:

• This latest incident marks the third time in six weeks that the Royal Navy has shadowed Russian task groups returning from Syria. In February, the Royal Navy shadowed a Russian task group when HMS Iron Duke, HMS Tyne, and RFA Tideforce monitored five ships, including three merchant vessels, as they sailed from Syria heading to a Russian Baltic port. In early March, HMS Somerset was used to complete a three-day mission watching RFN Boikiy as the corvette escorted a merchant vessel on its voyage. Defence Secretary John Healey told MPs in January 2025 that the Royal Navy had monitored a Russian spy ship, accusing the vessel, Yantar, of being used to gather intelligence and map the UK's underwater infrastructure.

Critical Undersea Infrastructure in the Baltic and Arctic:

• There has been a rise in Russian hybrid warfare attacks targeting critical undersea infrastructure (CUI), particularly fibre-optic cables in the Baltic and Arctic regions, since 2021. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has accused Russia of waging “hybrid warfare” on both land and sea. These include acts of sabotage large enough to affect Europe but small enough to avoid provoking a Western military response.

  
  

• Undersea cables are key to global internet connectivity, supporting everything from financial transactions and cloud computing to government operations and digital healthcare. Their physical vulnerability presents a significant challenge in an era of increasing geopolitical tensions. On 25 December 2024, the tanker Eagle S dragged its anchor for hundreds of miles, damaging the Estlink 2 power line between Finland and Estonia and telecommunications cables.

  
  

• Officials in Europe say Russia is deliberately using the vessels to target the crucial infrastructure used to transmit internet data and power. The Kremlin denied any connection with the Eagle S and other similar incidents in the Baltic. These incidents highlight the vulnerabilities of undersea cables and allow Russia to test the defences in the Baltic and Arctic. 

Assessment:

• The United Kingdom has repeatedly raised the alarm of Russian spy ships “loitering over” critical undersea infrastructure in the English Channel, particularly following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

  As geopolitical rivalries intensify, particularly between Russia and Western nations, the security of undersea cables has become a concern for global communications, national security, and business operations.

  
  

• In response to these threats, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) indicated that the Royal Air Force (RAF) will provide aircraft for a new NATO deployment designed to strengthen the protection of offshore infrastructure in the Baltic Sea. The UK also pledged to provide P-8 Poseidon and Rivet Joint maritime patrol and surveillance aircraft for the Baltic Sentry activity, following damage to the Estlink2 undersea cable. In April 2024, the UK, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Norway, and Denmark signed an agreement to protect critical underwater infrastructure in the North Sea from potential Russian sabotage.

  
  

GSA Forecast:

• Despite talks underway to bring an end to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the threat to undersea cables is likely to remain a consistent issue. Disrupted undersea cables are likely to hinder military readiness and strategic planning as NATO member states rely on secure communication channels for coordination across member states. Companies and governments must prioritise the development of robust contingency plans and invest in diversifying communication infrastructure to mitigate potential disruptions.